In the past Eric Amsel has collaborated on articles with Thomas R. Shultz. One of their most recent publications is The logical and empirical bases of conservation judgements. Which was published in journal Cognition.

More information about Eric Amsel research including statistics on their citations can be found on their Copernicus Academic profile page.

Eric Amsel's Articles: (3)

The logical and empirical bases of conservation judgements

AbstractIt is argued that conservation judgements are based on a particular combination of logical necessity and empirical belief. The empirical belief is that a given transformation will not alter a particular quantity (Elkind's conservation of identity). The logical aspect is a transitive deductive argument containing an initial equivalence of two quantities and the conservation of identity belief as premises which lead to the conclusion of maintained equivalence (Elkind's conservation of equivalence). In two experiments, it is shown that conservation of identity beliefs can be manipulated in subjects who have long since developed the capacity for transitive deductive inference. Untrained 10 year olds were unaware of how sublimation acts to alter certain quantities over particular transformations of shape. And untrained adults incorrectly believed that both the area and perimeter of a closed figure would be conserved over transformations which elongated the figure. Both groups of subjects could be trained in the correct conservation of identity beliefs and this affected their conservation of equivalence judgements in predicted ways. It is suggested that the locical aspect of conservation is developmentally stable and that the empirical aspect varies widely across problems and individuals because of its dependence on relevant experience.

Conceptual and pedagogical challenges in understanding the whole person

AbstractThe article introduces the special issues addressing Eric Johnson's account of Form Psychology, which provides a conceptual method to scientifically study the whole person. Form Psychology is presented as a theoretically significant proposal that integrates multiple conceptualizations of the whole person. The pedagogical value of such an understanding is also emphasized as undergraduate psychology students hold strong intuitions that the person is an integrated whole rather than a set of distinct systems.

A dual-process account of the development of scientific reasoning: The nature and development of metacognitive intercession skills

AbstractMetacognitive knowledge of the dual-processing basis of judgment is critical to resolving conflict between analytic and experiential processing responses [Klaczynski, P. A. (2004). A dual-process model of adolescent development: Implications for decision making, reasoning, and identity. In R. V. Kail (Ed.), Advances in child development and behavior, Vol. 31 (pp. 73–123). San Diego, CA: Academic Press]. Such conflict is ubiquitous when reasoning scientifically. Three studies explored the nature, development, and stability of this metacognitive knowledge. In each study, participants completed the ratio-bias judgment task, which assessed their tendency to make analytically based responses, and the ratio-bias evaluation task, which assessed their metacognitive knowledge of the processing basis of judgments on the task (Metacognitive Status). In Study 1, college students’ judgment performance was related to metacognitive status but not to general cognitive ability. In Study 2, metacognitive status was related to age and mathematics-related changes. Metacognitive status again predicted participants’ tendency to make analytically based judgments. In Study 3, college students’ judgments, but not metacognitive status, were affected by task conditions. The evidence suggests that assessing metacognitive knowledge is important for understanding how conflict between analytically and experientially based judgments is resolved.

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