Information pooling and collusion: an empirical analysis
Review articleOpen access
2004/06/01 Full-length article DOI: 10.1016/j.infoecopol.2003.10.003
Journal: Information Economics and Policy
AbstractThe paper adapts and empirically implements the squared sales test developed by Jin [Inf. Econom. Policy 8 (1996) 75] to determine if the information pooling arrangement mandated by The Livestock Mandatory Reporting Act of 1999 in the US is collusive. Using cattle slaughter data from the five regions (Texas–Oklahoma, Kansas, Nebraska, Colorado, and Iowa–Minnesota) used by the US Department of Agriculture to report the information, we find information pooling to be non-collusive in Nebraska and neutral in the rest of the regions. One plausible explanation for the result is the linkage between the structure of the cattle-feeding industry, frequency of cattle marketing, and availability of information before and after the Act.
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